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The Democratic Economy: Beyond Globalisation and Neoliberalism 
 
Luke Martell1  
 
ABSTRACT: An alternative economy is being built that goes 
beyond globalisation and neoliberalism. It draws on but breaks 
with previous paradigms and is complex, detailed and practical. 
It is based in pluralities, governmental and civil society, political 
and economic, and in its regenerative capacities can appeal 
across the political spectrum. It is being discussed and 
implemented by local governments, think tanks, academics, and 
national political parties. This article asks whether something 
localised and beyond global capital can avoid parochialism, 
inequality and the negative effects of competition, stretch to 
representing the interests of the public as a whole and work at 
national level. Can its embeddedness across institutions and 
plural actors protect it from reversal or does its shift to 
community power and interests and away from neoliberalism 
mean global capital will undermine it? The paper discusses what 
the new democratic economy is and how it can be implemented 
and maintained in the face of opposition.  
 
KEYWORDS: Democratic Economy; Labour Party; Jeremy 
Corbyn; Social Ownership; Community Wealth Building 
 
Introduction 
In 1945 the Labour Party came to power in the UK. It nationalised major 
industries and utilities and established the public National Health Service (NHS). 
The state institutions it set up were run top-down. Thirty-four years later Margaret 
Thatcher became Prime Minister. She instigated widespread privatisation, carried 
on by her successor John Major and opened public services up to the private sector 
 
1 Luke Martell is a Teaching Fellow in Sociology at the University of Sussex, UK. I am 
grateful to Cat Hobbs for her feedback on an earlier version of this article. A shorter earlier 
version was published in Fischer, J. and Stedman, G., eds, 2020, Imagined Economies–Real 
Fictions. New Perspectives on Economic Thinking in Great Britain, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 
and this version is published here with permission. 
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and marketisation. This was continued by Tony Blair, who removed the 
commitment to public ownership from the Labour Party constitution.  
 Subsequent Labour leader Ed Miliband made leftward tweaks to the 
party’s policies but with the 2015 leadership victory of Jeremy Corbyn the Blair era 
came to a close, at least for now. Where the private sector and market had become 
default policy choices, Corbyn brought back public ownership as mainstream 
rather than marginal. Socialism and social democracy have long espoused social 
ownership of production, especially in Marxist strands, and greater equality in 
distribution of income and services, the latter more in social democratic 
approaches. Corbyn’s Labour combined both, and proposals for social ownership 
discussed in this chapter see ownership of production and equality of distribution 
as linked. Furthermore, social ownership can ensure that public rather than private 
goals are achieved, including environmental objectives, greater accountability to 
society, long term over short term thinking, and more economically efficient 
operations in a number of ways.  
The Labour Party’s 2017 and 2019 election manifestos (Labour Party, 
2017b; 2019) proposed socially owned local energy companies and nationalisation 
of the main energy providers in the UK, the National Grid, water, the Royal Mail 
and part nationalisation of British Telecom so that the government could provide 
free broadband for all. Labour argued for insourcing of council services, municipal 
social ownership, assistance for the growth of the co-operative sector, and 
transferring company shares to workers (on inclusive ownership funds, also 
proposed by Bernie Sanders, see Lawrence, 2019). There is an emphasis on 
decentralised local forms of social ownership; and where national ownership then 
in a democratised form. A report for Labour on alternative models of ownership 
discusses co-ops, municipal and national state ownership, community wealth 
building, procurement by anchor institutions and the Preston model (Labour 
Party, 2017a; discussed by Guinan and Hanna, 2018 and New Socialist, 2017). 
Corbyn and his shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell, have been interested in 
experiments in social ownership and local economic regeneration made by 
Preston’s Labour council (Beckett, 2019; McDonnell, 2016; Reynolds, 2017). 
Labour lost the 2019 UK general election and Corbyn subsequently announced 
his resignation as leader. But the electoral result was less to do with the 
unpopularity of policies than demonisation of the leader and Brexit (see Davies 
2019, Goodwin, 2019 and Melloni, 2019).  
This article, though, goes beyond party policies. Proposals for social 
ownership and local wealth building are being pursued by think tanks like The 
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Democracy Collaborative in the USA and the UK Centre for Local Economic 
Strategy (CLES). They do not just suggest policy but are hands on and guide 
implementation. Much talked about sites for the implementation of social 
ownership policies, with the assistance of such action-oriented think-and-do tanks, 
are in Cleveland, Ohio in the USA and Preston, U.K. (CLES and Preston City 
Council, 2019; O’Neill, 2016; 2018; Howard, 2018a). Key values and principles of 
such approaches are: community and collaboration; place and locality; inclusion, 
good work and the workforce; democratic ownership and systemic and 
institutional change; multiplier effects; and sustainability and ethical finance (see 
Kelly and Howard, 2019; Kelly, McKinley and Duncan, 2015). Policies pursued are 
often quite localist, but debates about ownership raise the question of the role of 
the centralised state and public ownership, whether the latter can be democratised, 
and of the viability of such approaches at national and public-wide levels (Beckett, 
2019; The Economist, 2018; Howard, 2019). 
This article is a critical but sympathetic assessment of democratic 
economy proposals in Corbyn’s Labour and beyond. It argues that the democratic 
economy involves a return to Old Labour, but a new Old Labour, brought back to 
the mainstream of politics for more than a passing phase. I argue that the approach 
needs to marry local decentralised initiatives with national ownership for all and 
its supporters should not be complacent about the potential for reversal by fierce 
opposition. Old insights about the worth of national public ownership and the 
power of capitalist opposition remain vital.  
 
Community Wealth Building: From an Extractive to a Circulatory Economy 
 Democratic economy initiatives involve community wealth building, 
where wealth is generated and retained in localities, through political intervention 
to support socially owned companies and links between community business and 
anchor institutions (Brown et al., 2018; CLES and Preston City Council, 2019; 
Guinan and O’Neill, 2019b; Kelly et al, 2015). Anchor institutions are ones like 
hospitals, universities or councils that are more or less tied to the locality. They 
can be encouraged to shift the outsourcing of services from large capitalist 
corporations to local, sometimes socially owned, providers and require social 
objectives from contractors, for instance the payment of a living wage. The result 
is that rather than money flowing outside the area to big corporations and their 
shareholders, an extractive economy, it stays in the hands of community members 
and their socially and privately-owned businesses, a circulatory economy.  
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Retaining money in the local economy generates jobs there. For Mathew 
Brown, leader of Preston Council, it is about creating an alternative economic 
system at the local level. It is also a method of responding to local government cuts 
because it takes remaining wealth in the community and tries to keep it there. By 
the economy being tied increasingly to the locality rather than international 
investors it is more insulated from global economic shocks like the financial crisis 
(O’Neill, 2016). There is an equality element in wealth being captured for workers 
or other community owners and reinvestment, rather than being allowed to 
disappear away to capital and shareholders. In this sense, community wealth-
building is not just a technical approach to foster local economies but is also about 
power, re-balancing this away from international capital to local more democratic 
entities, be they local government or local enterprise socially owned by 
community actors in various ways (O’Neill, 2018).  
Brown et al. (2018) argue that key questions are who owns the wealth, 
influences it, benefits from it and where does it go? The system that community 
wealth is trying to get away from concentrates capital, while the place-based 
economy invests it. Brown et al. argue, furthermore, that finance focuses on 
property and land rather than employment-rich investments like manufacturing 
and services, and investment in automation means wealth is held less by society 
through employment than returns to capital extracted by investors. Proponents of 
the foundational economy argue investment should focus on basic infrastructure 
industries like energy distribution systems, education and health rather than areas 
such as property and tech (see Foundational Economy Collective, 2018).    
Preston Council’s assessment is that between 2012/13 and 2016/17 
procurement spending in the city rose from £38.3m (5%) to £112.3m (18.2%), and 
within surrounding Lancashire from £288.7 million (18.2%) to £488.7m (79.2%), 
despite overall declining by 15%. Four thousand extra employees started to receive 
the living wage, and Preston won awards for its improvement on various social and 
economic indicators, moved its position up on an index of social mobility, was 
lifted out of the 20% most deprived areas in the UK, and unemployment dropped 
and fell below the national average (CLES and Preston City Council, 2019; Manley, 
2018; Guinan and Hanna, 2018). 
These approaches fit with a trend towards municipal ownership and 
remunicipalisation where services are run by and returned to the local public 
sector. This is often reversing outsourcing and replacing privatisation and public-
private partnerships of the sort favoured by New Labour. For the Transnational 
Institute (2017), municipal ownership offers cost advantages for the public, a likely 
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greater commitment to worker welfare and social and environmental objectives, 
and greater accountability especially as a local form of state ownership (see 
Kishimoto, 2018).  
 
Institutional, Ownership and System Change: A Road to Socialism? 
The Economist (2018) argues that Corbyn’s monetary and fiscal policy 
was moderate and that it was in structural reform that radical change is envisaged. 
For Guinan and O’Neill (2018), proposals for a democratic economy involve an 
institutional turn, the focus on structural design and system, a predistribution and 
asset-based as much as redistributional approach to equality. Rather than income 
inequalities growing and being corrected by redistribution, more equal ownership 
of assets and distribution is encouraged from the start and equality is pursued 
through wealth as much as income, the reason for social ownership (Brown et al, 
2018; 126. Howard, 2018b). This involves a shift of power as well as income, 
because ordinary people are empowered in ownership which is not always the case 
in social democratic redistribution (Kelly et al., 2015; Labour Party, 2017a).  
This has connotations of Miliband’s advocacy of predistribution when 
Labour leader. However, his more modest focus was on labour market measures 
rather than ownership (New Socialist, 2017). Piketty (2014) identifies the 
importance of capital ownership as key to inequalities globally but is for regulating 
and taxing capital rather than systemic change. Advocates of the democratic 
economy argue that what are needed are systemic changes, not regulatory fixes to 
a bad system and after-the-fact redistributional corrections (Guinan and Hanna, 
2018, 110-13).  
Part of the case for this approach is on democracy and participation 
grounds, that we do not have democracy unless it is widened to the economy as 
well as politics and that political democracy is undermined if economic power can 
influence or determine political decisions so reducing accountability to voters (see 
Beckett, 2019; Guinan and O’Neill, 2019a; Labour Party, 2019a; New Socialist 
2017). The form of democracy envisaged here is also often participatory with 
people playing a greater role in the governance of businesses and utilities. One 
issue is how to build support for the democratic economy, and the incorporation 
of people into its democratic structures and ownership is seen as a way of fostering 
this (Berry and Guinan, 2019).  
A question is whether there is enough participatory consciousness in UK 
or other societies for this to work (Beckett, 2019). The pressure group We Own It 
argues that people will participate if they have the chance to in an inspiring way 
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(2019, 9). But participation may be biased to those with agency, time and money 
(Heslop, Morgan and Tomaney, 2019). There have been problems motivating, for 
example, parents and members of the community to participate in school 
governance, and research on co-operatives suggests that offering meaningful 
participation does not necessarily lead to it being taken up (Carter, 2006). Greater 
democratic participation may need more than the available structures, but also 
consciousness change, a cultural and not just political change. Furthermore, there 
is a question mark over whether individual participation in collective democracy 
can mobilise people behind the democratic economy, as Berry and Guinan (2019) 
propose, in the way that direct individual ownership stakes in capitalism may be 
able to. It involves people seeing their stake in a collective rather than individual 
sense which will require a hegemonic narrative to mobilise people behind this, as 
Thatcher’s popular capitalism of individual ownership did (see Hall, 1988).   
For some the systemic asset-based approach gives democratic economy 
proposals like Corbyn’s a socialist rather than social democratic identity (Financial 
Times, 2019). Brown et al. (2018, 134-5) describe it as consistent with social 
democracy (Mason, 2019) and for Finlayson (2019) Corbynism is mild reformism. 
It is not an approach to overthrow capitalism, at least not yet, so in that sense it is 
social democratic as much as socialist. But it is about replacing international 
corporate control where it can with local socially owned democracy and Guinan 
and O’Neill (2018) see Corbyn’s democratic economy proposals as more than 
social democracy and as socialist as do Guinan and Hanna (2018). The democratic 
economy may include social democracy but has aspects beyond it because it is 
structural and involves a shift in power and equality through social ownership as 
under socialism. This is as much as after the fact redistribution and regulations of 
a social democratic approach which accept a privately owned capitalist economy 
but tries to control and correct for its maldistributions. Berry and Guinan (2019) 
see the proposals as revolutionary or non-reformist reforms; changes within 
capitalism that gradually replace capitalism by the extension of democratised 
economic forms.  
If such proposals are partly socialist this raises the issue of the status of 
capitalism in them. Community wealth proposals do not amount to a dismantling 
of capitalism so much as a stepping away from contracting international capitalist 
companies in some places in favour of local community procurement. This does 
not systematically go after capital but sidesteps or excludes it to create parallel 
social ownership. It competes with international capital and creates democratic 
capital, selectively nationalising public services and spreading inclusive ownership, 
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rather than widely nationalising the economy. But the democratic economy 
excludes international capital, builds social ownership, and tries to enhance the 
direction of capital to social ends. It lives with capitalism but changes it in a way 
that builds in non-capitalist forms and aims alongside continuing capitalism. 
Beckett (2019) asks whether community wealth policies regenerate capitalism and 
allow it to regroup and come back in a harsher manifestation. This is a fair point 
but a key point of this article is that democratic economy proposals coming out of 
places like Preston and Cleveland should not be seen in isolation as they are 
compatible with approaches that do nationalise private companies and so 
complement a politics that does not just dilute capitalism but in part takes it over 
collectively.  
 
Plurality of Institutions: Complexity and Reversibility 
The democratic economy involves a plurality of institutions: socially 
owned enterprises of various sorts, some community-created co-ops but others 
local government set-up, with local and national government input to promote 
social ownership and build relations with anchor institutions. The local and 
national state facilitate leadership, tax breaks, loans, investment, procurement 
support, and shelter organisations that will fund, promote and support social 
ownership (Labour Party, 2017a). There are the anchor institutions themselves and 
their procurement policy. Think tanks are involved as they have been in Preston 
and Cleveland. Institutions include municipal enterprise, land trusts, public trusts, 
public banks and participatory budgeting. Initiatives may rise out of social 
movements (Milburn and Russell, 2019a) and support comes also from 
philanthropy and trade unions (Brown, 2018). The democratic economy is a 
pluralist approach and involves networks of agencies and complexity. Brown et al 
(2018, 135) describe the approach as social democracy plus plurality. There are 
pluralist networks of actors in the co-operative regions of Mondragon in Spain and 
Emilia Romagna in Italy (Guinan and Hanna, 2018). A lot is involved which is 
complex but also makes it more systemic and institutional and so potentially more 
effective.  
One hope is that such institutional and system interrelatedness makes the 
democratic economy more difficult to reverse and dismantle in the way 
nationalised industry and utilities were in the UK. Embedding change in society, 
it is hoped, is more likely to outlast changes of government and reversals by 
subsequent unsympathetic politicians. For Beckett (2019, 5), democratic economy 
proposals are for something more systemic and permanent than nationalisation 
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and tax. If less centrally linked to the state, as tax and nationalisation are, then it is 
more difficult for a new government to reverse them (Wainwright, 2017; We Own 
It, 2019). Difficulty to reverse may also come from plurality, of forms of ownership, 
actors and approaches, and potential attractiveness across the political spectrum 
(CLES and Preston City Council, 2019).  
But how far is this the case? As publicly owned companies could be sold 
off what is the difference here? Local and municipal social ownership is reversible 
as is procurement policy by competition regulations or changes in control of a 
local council. The democratic economy may be more complex to unravel than 
simple nationalisations or regulations but still do-able by a new government 
willing to change policy and dismantle relations and support. The question of 
reversibility is not clearly answered by characterisations of the changes as systemic 
and institutionalised because systems and institutions can be politically changed. 
Furthermore, discussion of reversibility is often focused on changes of government 
allowing democratic economic systems to be rolled back, an answer to this being 
that subsequent governments may like the local regenerative effects of the 
circulatory community wealth building approach and keep it. But key actors who 
are disadvantaged are international capital. Even if the local economy stays a 
capitalist for-profit one by and large, international capital gets side-lined by such 
an approach. Global capital may be as much a threat to the community wealth 
building economy, economic power as much a threat as political changes of 
government. And governments may find the appeal of local wealth retention less 
compelling when faced with the opposition of corporate influence and power.  
Berry and Guinan (2019) discuss the prospective resistance of finance 
and big business to Corbynist economic plans through measures like capital flight 
and investment strikes. They advocate controls on the movement of capital and 
international co-operation in response, although McDonnell denied capital 
controls were planned under a Labour government (Pickard and Shrimsley, 2019). 
They propose social value mandates on finance, transactions taxes, regulation and 
reforms of banking and the building of democratic finance and public banks. 
Berry and Guinan discuss opposition from the civil service, and reforms to deal 
with this such as: changing personnel and non-executive participants from the 
corporate sphere; creating units supportive of the government and exploiting 
pockets of sympathy in the civil service; and introducing new norms of decision-
making, a more pluralist economics and more social criteria for directing the civil 
service’s operations. Berry and Guinan argue that a left government should 
democratise the system to more participatory forms, which may require 
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devolution in some areas, so the shift is not from one set of technocratic experts 
to another but away from technocratic elite control.  
For some Corbynism needs to build coalitions with wider liberal and left 
political actors to carry out its aims (Gamble, 2019 and Lawson, 2019). This, 
however, would require giving up many already historically modest aims. But a 
strategy for maintaining community wealth and social ownership initiatives 
beyond reliance on systemic embeddedness will need to include a basis in social 
movements and popular consciousness. The editors of New Socialist (2017) put a 
strong emphasis on values, culture and movements being important in supporting 
such changes in the face of opposition from international capital, from within 
government institutions, and within the Labour Party. They argue that questions 
of culture and socialisation are as important as those of economic control and 
planning, echoing Labour’s report on alternative models of ownership. In fact, the 
importance of culture and consciousness is not just in defending such approaches 
against dismantling but behind them working in the first place, their development 
and realisation, for instance in ensuring the take up of participation in democratic 
structures. New Socialist also mention the importance of values such as co-
operation, solidarity, empathy and charity. They argue that democratic structures 
are important not just in themselves but for bringing in and sustaining support for 
what is democratised, giving people a stake in new structures so that they will want 
to hold on to them. But it will take more than democratic structures to build 
culture and values that will make the democratic economy work and protect it 
from reversal.  
Berry and Guinan (2019) emphasise the role of social movements in 
supporting democratic economy proposals against opposition. Movements can 
hold the left government to account while also being tolerant of the need for 
political compromises. In addition to building alternative democratic mass media 
that, unlike some left media, is viewed by those beyond the converted, social 
movements, alongside party members, can be part of mass political education. 
This needs to be to the public, beyond meetings for members and activists, and 
beyond the limits of social media, putting bodies on doorsteps and in workplaces 
directly explaining political policies that are distorted and misreported in the 
media. It involves mass party membership, registered member schemes to expand 
the volunteer base, volunteer and non-member participation, ‘big organising’, 
millions of doorstep ‘persuasive conversations’ that go deeper than data-gathering 
canvassing, and community organising mobilised not just around the electoral 
cycle. Some of this has been initiated under Ed Miliband, by Momentum and in 
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Democrat organising in the USA (Garland, 2019; Hilder, 2019; Klug and Rees, 
2019). It requires policy knowledge on the part of party members and activists for 
when they talk to the public, so relies on political education and training within 
the party and movements.  
Movements can also be forces of resistance in the face of establishment 
opposition, through protest, education or disruption, for instance by trade union 
action (German, 2019). With a high party membership, the group Momentum in 
place and links with trade unions the Labour Party has blocks of a movement basis 
in place. Alongside the top-down use of social movements, new agendas and 
narratives that frame peoples’ experiences and give them causal explanations and 
solutions (New Economics Foundation, 2013) and practical initiatives and 
experiments, such as alternative economies, often come from bottom up (New 
Economics Foundation, 2015). So that is a role for social movements, although new 
ideas are less the issue for the left in the current phase than mobilising 
understanding of and support for them.  
 
Social Change and Scaling Up 
One issue may be that experiments like Preston and Cleveland are too 
small scale, piecemeal, incremental, localist, and do not involve large-scale 
transformation. A question is whether these can be widened and scaled up 
(Guinan and O’Neill, 2019a; Howard, 2018b). However, the local approaches can 
be experimental, seeing whether the approach works, and if it does then 
demonstrative, showing the way for others. There is a prefigurative element 
(Wainwright, 2017), building alternatives now as a basis for a wider economy along 
the same lines. Initiatives like those in Preston can spread across Labour 
authorities; and have been doing so in the UK (Leibowitz and McInroy, 2019). 
That such approaches were in Labour’s 2017 manifesto is a sign of cases like 
Preston widening outwards and rising vertically.  
The pursuit of change in democratic economy proposals can be not just 
through experiment and demonstration but also by active political leadership at 
government level and the involvement of mainstream anchor institutions. They 
can be pursued not only through showing things can work, thus encouraging 
adoption and scaling up, but also positively led, facilitated and built by the state, 
local and national, and by public sector institutions creating public-commons 
partnerships (Milburn and Russell, 2019a; 2019b). The Preston Model is more 
political than other social alternatives and so more open to being developed by 
means other than just prefiguration; a political and not just social basis for change. 
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It is less extra-political, more in politics and public-public relationships, and more 
in the mainstream of society than on the margins of it or separate spaces.  
Cumbers and Hanna (2018) discuss the scaling up of local initiatives and 
the role of government in this process. Government can pursue change through 
top down nationalisations, remunicipalisation, economic incentives and public 
funding for social ownership, allowing first refusal for employees to buy 
companies at risk of closure or takeover, and public procurement policies that 
favour social and environmental goals and local co-ops, a number of these Labour 
Party policy under Corbyn. This is built on on-the-ground experimentation 
promoted more widely at national level by government. A Community Wealth 
Building Unit being established in Corbyn’s office shows the potential for the 
approach being pursued at national level. Guinan and O’Neill (2018) discuss how 
community wealth building can be widened from Preston and have taken shape 
in Labour Party policy. They suggest the NHS could be the ‘mother of all’ anchor 
institutions with enormous procurement power. Labour's 2017 manifesto 
contained democratic economy proposals as does its report on Alternative Models 
of Ownership. Labour’s proposals have shifted the political agenda to re-
incorporate public ownership (Guinan and Hanna, 2018; Hanna, 2018a) and The 
Economist (2019) notes that the ideas of Corbynomics may survive when the 
Corbyn leadership has gone.  
As a significant element of the approaches being discussed concerns 
funds being reinvested locally rather than disappearing out of the area they can 
appeal also to Conservative authorities, locally and nationally, interested in local 
economic regeneration (O’Neill, 2018). New Socialist (2017) argues that 
approaches discussed by Labour have a ‘sober practicality’ to them and that social 
ownership is popular with the public, as noted below. The approaches do not 
necessarily involve raising tax, increasing public spending or nationalisation, off-
putting from a right-wing perspective, so can appeal across political divides. 
Mathew Brown (O’Neill, 2016) sees them as common sense (although also 
ideological). This can make it easier to implement by the left because they may 
encounter less right-wing opposition, and to sustain across changes in government 
as the right may be happy to allow local wealth building to continue. Guinan and 
Hanna (2018) argue the approach overcomes simplistic binaries of pro- and anti-
business as it is about promoting local small business against big corporate capital. 
However, the emphasis on the political right and capital agreeing with 
democratic economy proposals puts a lot of faith in rational persuasion about 
policy and overcoming polarisation between groups that are historically opposed 
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and have conflicting interests. Furthermore, the appeal to the political right may 
be to one that sees merits in place-based wealth building and local economic 
development. A right seen in more class terms as representatives of international 
capital will be less convinced as global capital is undermined by this approach. It 
loses business to local contractors and some on the right will be put off by some of 
this being to co-operative, i.e. non-capitalist, enterprise, which they may view as 
eroding the place of private capital and as less efficient. Despite New Socialist (2017) 
seeing democratic economy proposals as practical and crossing over left-right 
divides they also warn that they could be frustrated in their formulation and 
implementation.  
 
Localism and its Limits? Community, Competition and Inequality 
There may be limits in the localism of democratic economy proposals. 
They may be best suited to areas with a strong local identity, attachment to place 
and social infrastructure (Heslop et al, 2019). The case for the approach can be 
made on the basis of a supportive culture and consciousness but less so for places 
that lack this. Furthermore, it depends on place-based institutions that serve as 
anchor institutions and is not so useful for places where these are less prevalent 
(O’Neill, 2016).  
The proposals discussed are based in community wealth creation and its 
retention locally so that it circulates there rather than being displaced outside. This 
raises issues to do with localism. Retention of wealth by the community rather 
than its extraction by corporate capital who have contracts with local institutions 
will be welcomed by most with left-wing and community concerns. A more 
contentious issue is the keeping of wealth locally at the expense of its displacement 
to a broader community. Proposals can be seen to be concerned with local interests 
and so parochial and insular, and not concerned with the interests and welfare of 
the wider community in society nationally and globally.  
For poor areas localism may be defensible. In such cases retaining wealth 
for local regeneration makes sense. But more widely this could mean in better off 
areas wealth is retained when redistribution to less well-off areas would be 
desirable. One solution is pursuing such policies within the context of a more 
regionally redistributive approach at national or supra-national levels. So, areas 
where wealth builds up could have some redistributed to poorer areas. This would 
require local wealth generators not losing the incentive to create and retain wealth 
locally if they know some will be redistributed. However, this is do-able and is 
done under many redistributive structures.   
The Democratic Economy | 105
O’Neill (2018) in discussion with the Democracy Collaborative’s Ted 
Howard raises the issue of the ‘beggar thy neighbour’ approach of community 
wealth building. Howard rejects the criticism for this stage in the process of 
building community wealth strategies which he says concerns resetting the 
balance between local communities and international capital, as much as it is 
about localities versus localities. O’Neill makes a similar circumstantial point and 
says that local government has to step up in the absence of other approaches and 
interest from national government. He argues this is a non-ideal situation and if 
national government was more interested in inequality then local economic 
development strategies could be different. Furthermore, what the local community 
wealth approach replaces is, for Howard, itself protectionism where each city 
competes to attract investment at the expense of another. The difference is that 
competing for extractive capital allows profits to go out of the area to international 
shareholders and is not committed in an ongoing way to the local area. 
O’Neill (2016) suggests two paths: one is favouring institutions that are 
local and another those that have more ethical standards. Of course, the two can 
go together but the emphasis on more ethical and social business would suggest 
supporting alternative economic structures as much as, or even rather than in 
some cases, local regeneration. Favouring social business over the local business 
where the two do not coincide would be hard for a local authority but it does give 
an ethical rather than a localist slant to the approach. CLES and Preston (2019) say 
that choosing suppliers based on social value in Preston has not always meant the 
local one. Furthermore, the Preston policy has led to a shift in contracts away from 
London and the south-east but not from the rest of the country so has not 
necessarily meant abandoning a commitment to a wider community beyond the 
local one.   
This raises a related issue that such an approach can lead to competition 
and perhaps inequality between localities. In locally focused wealth creation and 
retention approaches, areas may be focused on their own interests and become 
competitive with other areas and in competition there are winners and losers, so 
inequalities grow. Competition can also lead to wasteful duplication and 
reluctance to share resources or information, such as research and design. This can 
be the case with local authorities leading and supporting community wealth 
creation or with local co-ops competing. Hanna (2018a) says competition is as 
much an issue as ownership. A further dimension is that co-ops run the risk of 
being biased to the sectional group that owns them, for instance workers, as 
localism is towards the locality. Wider forms of ownership may help to counter 
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sectional interest or competitive inequality that arises from sectional ownership or 
localism. 
These problems echo issues raised by theories for market socialism where 
the transformatory element is seen as co-operative ownership of companies but 
within a market context (LeGrand and Estrin, 1989). The market socialist 
argument is that ownership is the significant issue for socialists and a switch from 
private to social ownership the key thing in the transition from capitalism to 
socialism. The hostility of socialism to markets is seen to be misplaced while an 
economy with socially owned enterprises operating on a market achieves 
socialism. However, while some definitions of socialism, for instance Marxist ones, 
do put the priority on collective ownership many socialists also emphasise co-
operation and equality. While an economy of co-ops involves co-operation 
internal to the co-ops it can involve the opposite between co-ops unless specific 
measures are made to build external co-operation, which is of course possible. And 
competition on a market leads to economic inequality which for many socialists is 
undesirable. 
 
National and Public Ownership 
More national public ownership may be desirable, so there is less 
replication of activities and more sharing of information than under decentralised 
forms (Hanna, 2018ab). This need not replace local ownership, as pluralism is 
desirable for various reasons, and in many cases greater local accountability and 
participation is positive. The experience of state ownership itself has suggested that 
greater democratisation and decentralisation is desirable. Another possible route 
is networks between co-ops and local authorities where agreements are made not 
to compete or conceal resources and information. This is a feature of the co-
operative landscape in places like Mondragon and Emilia Romagna.  
Hobbs (2018) argues that public ownership represents the public as a 
whole and all who are affected by a company’s actions so not just particular groups 
(such as workers in worker’s co-ops) or communities (as in community wealth 
building). As such it can overcome insularity, sectionalism and localism, and 
oversee equality between local areas so some do not grow better off at the expense 
of others. For her, this is mostly relevant for public services. The New Socialist 
(2017) also stresses national public ownership as an approach that can guard 
against geographical inequalities, not just economically but also in equality of 
service nationally. We Own It (2019) argue for local, regional and national levels 
in social ownership. Relatedly Common Wealth (2019) advocate pluralism in 
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ownership against a monoculture of ownership. For Hobbs and We Own It (2019), 
we should not denigrate state ownership too much. It works or has worked for rail 
internationally and the NHS, for example. It would be a mistake to go too far the 
other way. Public ownership allows economies of scale, consistency, equality and 
cross-subsidy.  
Cumbers and Hanna (2018) also argue that local and national state public 
ownership is better for distributing benefits more equally. For them, other forms, 
such as local and workers ownership, build wealth for specific groups, so can 
exacerbate inequality and create new forms of vested interest. Municipal 
ownership is better because it covers all local groups. Also, sectional groups face 
greater market pressures so may externalise environmental costs. State ownership 
can be better on environmental grounds. Because of its scale it can have a large 
impact if pursuing green policies.  
The Labour Party’s report on alternative models discusses national 
ownership and arguments for it; as well as acknowledging its pitfalls and the case 
for its greater democratisation, via the inclusion of plural involved and affected 
stakeholder groups in governance, for example local and national states, workers, 
consumers, managers, experts and community groups (Berry and Guinan, 2019 
and We Own It, 2019). This involves the incorporation of industrial democracy 
into public ownership (Berry and Guinan, 2019). Public ownership may need to 
be reformed from forms it has taken in the past. But problems of public ownership, 
such as they have been, could have been due to types of management as much as 
ownership itself and could be addressed by investigating new forms of 
management (Hobbs, 2018) as much as by a shift to private ownership. Reform of 
public ownership can involve both democratising it and reforming its type of 
management and these may be related and go hand in hand.   
Polling data shows support for public ownership (Hanna, 2018a; 
Kishimoto, 2018; We Own It, 2019). The Legatum Institute found in 2017 that three 
quarters of the UK public believe that water, electricity, gas and rail should be 
publicly owned, across generations and party allegiance, and 50% feel the banks 
should be nationalised (Elliott and Kanagasooriam, 2017). A 2017 Yougov poll 
shows lower level but still majority support for nationalisation of Royal Mail, water, 
rail, and energy, across age, class and region (Smith, 2017). For We Own It: ‘Public 
services are the best things humans have ever invented’ (2019, 9) and beyond the 
UK public ownership is not so outlandish, even in the free market USA where it is 
widespread (Guinan and Hanna 2018; Hanna, 2018ab). It has been equated too 
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easily with centralised, bureaucratic, inefficient top-down organisation, despite 
evidence for efficiency (Hobbs, 2018; Cumbers and Hanna, 2018). 
Murphy (2019) raises the issue of tensions between international, 
national and decentralised levels and argues that Corbynist Labour do not deal 
with these. But an approach that combines decentralisation with central state 
power may be doing exactly that as central state power can be an overarching 
context for decentralisation, taking on those things that decentralisation cannot 
do so well (e.g. public services and environmental protection) and overseeing 
inequalities and coherence between decentralised units, not to mention linking 
upwards from them to the international level (Adler, 2019). At international levels, 
however, democratic economy proposals may have implications for trade and 
globalisation that have been less explored, but within the context of a left that is 
sceptical about international trade deals (Berry and Guinan, 2019; Pickard and 
Shrimsley, 2019).   
 
The Alternative Economy: Beyond Globalisation and Neoliberalism 
 There is an alternative economy being built, place-based and democratic, 
beyond globalisation and neoliberalism. The democratic economy is about local 
value, both economic and social, not international corporate value; the creation 
and retention of wealth in the community rather than the making and extracting 
of it from the outside and for shareholders rather than citizens. This is less about 
trickling down than trickling up (Howard 2019). The democratic economy 
involves the marrying of political and civil society, and of the mainstream and 
margins. It includes the role of the entrepreneurial state rather than rejection of 
active government, a local state but also national, and a view of it working in 
alliance with various institutions rather than on them or by widescale 
appropriation of private ownership. The theme of reinvestment in the local 
economy can appeal to local communities and those who may not be socialist. 
This is part of its practical edge, although it is in a way that may appeal to parochial 
local self-interest which has negative dimensions. 
 It involves an institutionalisation of the alternative and change via a 
system, institutions and assets rather than leaving these as they are and 
compensating by redistributional correction. It is maybe not socialism replacing 
social democracy, but socialist as well as social democratic. And it is more Old 
Labour than New Labour, rejigged to give greater emphasis to the local and 
decentralised. A big question with social alternatives outside politics is how far 
they can be realised more widely; political alternatives raise issues of entrenchment 
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and institutionalisation. And local decentralised social ownership needs to be 
allied, as under Corbynite Labour, with national public ownership if it is to be 
equally for all: new Old Labour but still Old Labour. 
The democratic economy is not just utopian but also practical, involving 
think and do actions, mainstream and political as well as alternative and social. It 
involves pluralism in various different ways. There is a re-politicisation of 
alternatives: beyond extra-political alternatives to more public-public political-
society links. So extra-political alternatives built on but allied with political 
intervention and the mainstream public sector; a place for the political in social 
alternatives. It involves formal as well as informal sectors. It is a channel for scaling 
up using methods including but beyond experiment and demonstration; also 
politically designed and facilitated, linked to politics and party. It involves moving 
to an alternative not just in isolated experiments on the fringes of society but via 
conventional local and national politics, set up downwards and scaled across as 
well as scaled up from below.  
The democratic economy involves the materialisation, politicisation and 
pluralisation, through institutions and broad support, of an alternative economy. 
As such, its potential for scaling up is good compared to some other radical 
alternatives. But even if the political right can be convinced, this new economy will 
face opposition from international capital as it is them that are disadvantaged. 
Complacency over parochialism and over resistance and the potential for reversal 
needs to be avoided. Embeddedness in society in the face of opposition from 
international capital and other vested interests will require going beyond just 
institutionalisation. There will need to be responses and reforms to capital, the 
civil service and media, and a popular consciousness and social movement basis 
behind the democratic economy. 
So, the democratic economy needs to be for all of society equally as well 
as localised; and geared to a fight back against powerful opposition and not 
complacent about its wider appeal. It also raises the question of the international 
regrouping of the left. Returning economic power to the people and democratic 
accountability, and a politics for the many against the few has been on the upsurge 
elsewhere: in Spain where Podemos is in alliance with the centre-left in power, 
Portugal where an anti-austerity left has been governing, and with support for 
Sanders in the USA, for example. The experience of Syriza in Greece, though, has 
indicated the perils for the left when faced with elite power and a divorce from 
social movement support. 
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